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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND HIRSCHBACH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
DUBUQUE PACKING CO., a corp-
oration, and GIFFORD-WILSON. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8661 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents deem it necessary to add the fol-
lowing to the .statement of facts as set forth in the brief 
of appellant. The driver of the appellant's vehicle was 
an employee, (R. 3), and, at the time of the .accident was 
driving it in the course of his employment. (R. 10). The 
statement that the respondents were negligent (App. 
Br., pg. 1), and the further statement as to the amount 
of damages suffered by the appellant, if any, (App. Br. 
pg. 2), are wholly irrelevant and imn1aterial to this 
appeal. As we se.e it, the sole issue boils down to whether, 
under the facts of this case, the appellant was guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law. 
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STATE1IENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
THE RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
ARGU~IENT 
A long and unbroken line of Utah decisions \Vell 
establishes the law applicable to the facts of this case. 
Although there are earlier decisions, what is generally 
regarded as the leading Utah case on the subject, is 
Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Prod1tcts Co., 80 Ut. 331. 
15 Pac. (2d) 309, where the court quoted with approval 
from the case of O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 Ut. 368, 213 Pac. 
791, as follows: 
"But entirely apart from any statutory re-
quirements, the law requires that, if a person 
desires to operate his automobile on the public 
streets or highways after dark, he must see to it 
that it is equipped with proper, suitable, and suffi-
cient lights, so that the operator may discover 
any objects or obstructions that may be en-
countered on the highw·ay. The law in that regard 
is clearly and tersely stated in Serfas v. Lehigh, 
etc., Ry. Co., 270 Pa. 306, 113 A. 370, 14 A.L.R. 
791, where the court, in speaking of the duty of 
the operator of an automobile to have the same 
equipped with proper lights, said: 
"'* * * It is the dutv of a chauffeur traveling 
by night to have such ~ headlight as ·will enable 
him to see in advance the face of the highway 
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3 
and to discover grade crossings, or other obstacles 
in his path, in time for his O'Nll safety, and to 
keep such control of his car as will enable him to 
stop and avoid obstructions that fall within his 
vision.' " (Emphasis Ours) 
The rule expressed imposes a duty upon persons 
operating vehicles on our highways at night, not only 
to have the vehicle equipped with adequate lights, but 
also to heed the obstructions that they see within the 
range of their lights and to maintain sufficient control 
of their vehicle to avoid such obstructions. 
On the night of the .accident in the case at bar, the 
weather was clear and visibility good. (R. 36). The view 
of appellant's driver was unobstructed, (R. 33), and he 
observed the parking lights of the respondents' trailer. 
The appellant's driver failed to heed this clearly visible 
obstruction until it was too late to avoid the collision, 
(R. 36), and the .accident ensued. 
In the most recent expression of this court in the 
case of Fretz vs. Anderson, 5 Utah (2d) 290, 300 Pac. 
( 2d) 642, the court at page 648 of that case stated: 
"The rule that a motorist is normally required 
to so operate his machine as to be able to see and 
avoid substantial discernible objects in the road 
ahead is generally recognized as is its concomitant 
that the motorist must equip his machine with 
proper headlights and be able to stop within the 
distance of the lights' projection." (Emphasis 
Ours.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
The facts of this case bring it clearly within the 
operation of the .above quoted 111le. The obstruction in 
the road, or the object parked on the road, respondents' 
trailer, was discernible, and it was not avoided, either by 
stopping or by turning aside. 
vV e recognize, of course, that exceptions to the Dalley 
Rule have been created where the driver's viBw of the 
stationary object in the collision was in some way ob-
structed, e.g. smoke, mist and headlight glare in Moss 
vs. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 "Ct. 253, 98 Pac. (2d) 
363; the blinding headlights in Neilson vs. Watanabe, 90 
Ut. 401, 62 P.ac. (2d) 117; the dense fog in Trimble vs. 
U. P. Stages, 105 ct. 457,142 Pac. (2d) 67±; and the curve 
in the road in Hodges vs. Waite, 2 Utah (2d) 152, 270 
Pac. (2d) 461. However, in the case at bar by the appel-
lant's own admission, there was no obstruction to the 
driver's view of the stopped vehicle of respondent, im-
mediately prior to the accident, and therefore, nothing 
to take the case out of the operation of the Dalley rule. 
Two post-Dailey cases, Olson v. D. & R. G. R. R., 
98 Ut. 208, 98 Pac. (2d) 9±±, and Horsley vs. Robinson, 
112 Utah 227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592, have recognized that 
the Dalley rule is not limited to the concept that a person 
operating .a vehicle on the highway must drive at a 
speed at which it is possible to stop within the range 
of apparent visibility. The court, in the latter case, in 
commenting on Nickolerozwulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Ut. 465, 
214 Pac. 304, stated at page 598 : 
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"We held that defendant was negligent as 
a matter of law, no matter how dark and stormy 
the night or how bad the visibility, if he drove 
at such a rate of speed that he was unable to 
avoid running plaintiff down within the distance 
plaintiff could be seen walking ahead of defend-
ant's car on the highway. To the same effect see : 
Dalley vs. Mid-W e.stern Dairy Products Co., 80 
Ut. 331, 15 P. 2d 309, Haarstrich v. Oregon Short 
Line Co., 70 Ut. 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 
61 Utah 358, 213 Pac. 791." 
"The Nickoleroporulos vs. Ramsey case is in 
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate 
a vehicle on the highway at any time withottt 
having it under sufficient control so that others 
using the highway will not be unreasonably en-
dangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is 
required to travel to acc01nplish that end." (Em-
phasis ours) . 
The case of Wright vs. Maynard, 120 Ut. 504, 235 
Pac. (2d) 916, cited by the appellant, is clearly distin-
guishable from the case at bar and from the Dalley case. 
In Wright vs. Maynard, the defendant driv,er struck a 
moving object (the plaintiff), while avoiding the parked 
vehicle on the ro.adside. In both the case at bar and the 
Dalley case the parked vehicle was struck. The logic 
of Wright vs. Maynard supports the position of the 
respondent in the case at bar. In Wright vs. Maynard, 
the question of defendant's negligence was held to be 
one of fact for the jury because, although the defendant 
was not able to stop in time to .avoid the collision, he 
had sufficient control of his automobile to turn out and 
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thu.s avoid collision with the stationary obstruction. In 
the case at bar, appellant neither stopped nor turned 
out, but continued blithely into collision with respond-
ents' vehicle without offering any plaussible excuse what-
soever for doing so. 
The following language from Dalley vs. Midwestern 
Dairy Prochtcts at 15 Pac. (2d) 311, is particularly pertin-
ent to the case at bar : 
" ... A.s plaintiff approached the place where 
the truck was standing on the night in question, 
the highway was straight and level for a distance 
of at least a mile. The truck was directly in front 
of him and in his course of travel. According to 
his testimony he was keeping a constant lookout 
ahead. If he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he 
was guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There 
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an 
ordinary, clear, quiet summer night with no moon. 
So far as appears there was nothing to divert 
his attention from the road in front of him. He 
knew he w.as traveling upon a highway that was 
used by pedestrians, and persons traveling on 
horseback and in horse-drawn vehicles, none of 
whom are required to diselose a light to warn 
others of their presence upon the highway. In 
such case it must inevitably follow that plaintiff 
did not keep a lookout ahead, or, if he did, he 
either did not heed 'what he saw or he could not 
see the truck becau.se his lights w'"ere not such as 
were prescribed by law." (Emphasis ours.) 
The facts of the case at bar are even stronger than 
those in the Dalley case, because here respondents' vehicle 
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was adequately equipped with lights indicating it,s pres-
ence, whereas in the Dalley case the defendant's truck was 
completely unlighted and amounted to a trap for the 
unwary motorist. 
The fundamental fallacy of appellant's position is 
that he fails to conceive that there are two facets to the 
Dalley rule. 
(,a) The operator must drive at such speed as to 
be able to .stop or otherwise avoid substantial objects on 
the highway within the distance illuminated by his head-
lights. 
(b) He must s,ee and pay h.eed to what is there 
to be seen. This latter facet is of course, not limited to 
the Dalley ca.se, but applies to all driving situations. It 
has been often recognized by this court and commented 
on in other line.s of traffic cases such as open intersection 
cases and pedestrian cases. 
It would be an anomoly indeed if a plaintiff in one 
case would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law 
in failing to observe and ,avoid a wholly unlighted ob-
struction in a highway; while in another case where the 
obstruction was lighted and observed by the plaintiff, it 
should be held a jury question whether he w,as guilty of 
negligence on the feeble excuse of "mistake of judg-
ment." l\1any types of negligence are "mistakes of judg-
ment," e.g. a driver entering an intersection in the belief 
that he is ,ahead of another approaching from the right; 
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a driver attempting a left hand turn in the belief that 
approaching cars are not so close as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard. But where the mistake is as gross as 
appe.ars here, no jury should be permitted to speculate 
on its legal effect. 
The appellant cites Smith v. Bennett, 1 Ut. (2d) 
224, 265 Pac. (2d) 401, as supporting his contention that 
mere errors of judgment are questions for the jury. 
However, he overlooks an important qualification of the 
rule of that case, as set forth in the opinion of the Court: 
"A major dissimilarity exists between the 
facts of the c.ase now before the court and plain-
tiff's authorities. In these cases we were con-
cerned with situations such as intersectional acci-
dents where the plaintiff's attention w~ de-
manded in more than one direction or in more 
than one pl.ace. Since his attention could not be 
in all places and in all directions at once, it was 
a question of human judgment as to how his at-
tention should he distributed among the several 
competing demands. A question of fact for the 
jury was presented as to whether his distribution 
of .attention was reasonable. 
"In the instant case there 1cas but one demand 
upon plaintiff's attention. There is no room for 
a reasonable difference of o pi,nion as to where 
her attention should have been concentrated; it 
was incumbent upon her to observe the condition 
of approaching traffic. That she failed to use due 
care in doing so is manifest from the evidence." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
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In the case at bar, appellant's driver saw the p.arked 
truck of respondent some 400 feet ahead. He erroneously 
concluded that the respondents' truck was moving. The 
sole object requiring the attention of appellant's driver 
immediately prior to the accident was the stopped truck 
of the respondents. The driver's .attention should have 
be·en solely on this object before him. Long before a 
collision ocurred he should have recognized the true 
situation and either stopped or turned out to avoid a 
collision. 
The appellant, (at page 10 of his brief), cites Davis 
et al., v. Brown, 20 Wash. (2d) 219, 147 Pac. (2d) 263 
as an example wherein a court, committed to the doctrine 
of the Dalley case, recognized an "error in judgment" 
distinction. However, the Washington Court was not 
committed to the Dalley rule. In the case of M orehottse 
vs. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157 (1926), 
the Supreme Court of Washington definitely rejected 
the Dalley rule. The Washington rule is wholly contrary 
to the Utah rule, .and the Washington decision is of no 
aid in the determination of the case at bar. Nor is there 
any need to go beyond the pronouncements of this court 
in seeking a solution to the problem. 
The plaintiff would have us believe that no "judg-
ment" was exercized in the Dalley, Fretz and Benson 
(Benson vs. D. & R. G., 4 Ut. (2d) 28, 286 Pac. (2d) 790) 
ca.ses. It is respectfully submitted that every conscious 
human action requires the exercise of some degree of 
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10 
judgment, whether or not that judgment be erroneous, 
or whether or not the action based on that judgment 
be negligent. The cases heretofore cited establish a well-
defined standard of conduct for persons operating ve-
hicles on the highway during the night. As applicable 
to this ca.se the objective standard may he stated thus: 
A person operating a vehicle on the highway at night 
must keep such control of his vehicle that will enable 
him to stop and avoid obstructions that fall within his 
VlSlOn. 
Any violation of this objective standard of conduct 
1s negligence as a matter of law. The "mere error of 
judgment" of the appellant's driver coupled with the 
speed of his vehicle led to a violation of this standard 
of conduct - a failure to control the vehicle and avoid 
the object within the range of vision. There could be 
no more absolute breach of .a positive duty. Yet, the 
appellant contends that the court should at this late 
date accept a subjective test of "error in judgment" in 
contraposition to a clear objective standard pr01nulgated 
and many times reaffinned by our Court. \V e have well 
recognized exceptions to this objective standard of the 
Dalley rule, but similarly these exceptions are based upon 
objective extraneous factors, i.e. interference with visi-
bility. On the other hand plaintiff proposes a subjective 
modification of our rule based on "error in judgment". 
Could not this san1e modification be grafted into every 
objective standard of conduct which the court has laid 
down 1 Regarding the use of "judgment" as a standard, 
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Ju.stice Tyndal once said, "Instead ... of saying that the 
liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the 
judgment of each individual, which wouiJ..d be as v.ariable 
as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought 
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all case·s 
a regard to condition such as a man of ordinary prudence 
would observe." Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 
475; 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837). 
In the case at bar we have a well est.ablished stand-
ard of care which a man of ordinary prudence should 
observe. This standard of care has been violated. The 
inevitable conclusion is that the appellant is guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case bring it squarely within the 
Dalley rule. The court below correctly concluded that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. The judgment should be ;affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN AND 
JAMES A. MURPHY 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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